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INTRODUCTION
In 1968, Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy refused to enroll their chil-
dren in high school. The parents were tried and convicted of violating Wisconsin's
compulsory attendance law, which required schooling until age sixteen, and they were
fined five dollars each.' They appealed on the grounds that the compulsory atten-
dance law, as applied, violated their right to the free exercise of their religion. The
parents were members of conservative Amish denominations (the Old Order Amish
and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church 2), and they insisted that education
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2007. Oxford University, D.Phil. (Politics) 2004, M.Phil.
(Politics) 2003. Yale University, B.A. 2001. Thanks to William Baude, Stephen Carter, David
Pozen, Catherine Roach, Michael Steffen, and Lindsey Worth for helpful and thought-
provoking comments on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors or infelicities are, of course,
my own.
1 State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Wis. 1971), afftd, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
2 There seems to be some confusion as to which parents belonged to which denomi-
nation. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,207 (1972) ("Respondents Jonas Yoder
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beyond the eighth grade was contrary to their religion and way of life. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court found this infringement impermissible and overturned their convic-
tion.3 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed.'
The Court, per Chief Justice Burger, found that "Old Order Amish communities
today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church
community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence. This concept
of life aloof from the world and its values is central to their faith."5 The Court bal-
anced this belief against the state's interest in secondary education6 and concluded
that the educational interests of the state were outweighed by the religious beliefs
of the parents. It thus held that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the
State from compelling [the parents] to cause their children to attend formal high
school to age 16."'
Wisconsin v. Yoder presented the Court with a sharp clash between the state's
interest in social reproduction through education-that is, society's interest in using
the educational system to perpetuate its collective way of life among the next gener-
ation-and the parents' interest in religious reproduction-that is, their interest in
passing their religious beliefs on to their children. This Article will take up the chal-
lenge of that clash. I shall refer throughout to the question of when, if ever, parents
have a religious freedom-based claim to exempt their children from part or all of a
state-mandated educational requirement as "the Yoder question," but the inquiry is
not focused on the facts of the case itself. Rather, I shall engage with the competing
theories put forward by scholars and judges who believe in a broad right of religious
reproduction, trumping the state's interest in social reproduction ("Yoder support-
ers") and scholars and judges who believe that the interest in social reproduction
should trump contrary claims by insular religious groups ("Yoder opponents"). I will
suggest that each of the major competing theories is fundamentally flawed, and I will
offer an alternative analysis based on communitarian and democratic values.
It is especially important that we continue to think through these issues because
Yoder by no means settled the Yoder question. As debates continue to rage about
issues like the teaching of evolution, creationism, or intelligent design in public schools,8
and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion, and respondent Adin Yutzy
is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church."), with State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d
at 539 ("The appellants Jonas Yoder, Adin Yutzy, members of the Old Order Amish religion,
and Wallace Miller, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church .. .
3 State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d at 539.
4 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
5 Id. at 210.
6 Id. at 214.
7 Id. at 234.
8 See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(holding that the teaching of intelligent design violated the Establishment Clause); Gertrude
Himmelfarb, Monkeys and Morals, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12,2005, at 33; Jodi Rudoren, Ohio
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it remains clear that our society continues to struggle with the proper line between
societal and parental control over education. It should also be noted that this is an
area of constitutional law in which originalist methodologies give scant guidance-
education was not seen as a state function in the early republic.9 Prior to the pas-
sage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the religion clauses of the First Amendment ap-
plied only to the federal government, ° and education was certainly not seen as a federal
function. Our analysis will thus have to rely on other interpretive methodologies, in-
cluding a consideration of the political values underlying our conceptions of religious
freedom and education.
The democratic-communitarian analysis of the Yoder problem offered in this
Article begins with the communitarian intuition that social subjects are constituted
by multiple sources of value-everything from low-level value sources like families
and churches to higher-level sources like political parties and nations-and that a
rich diversity of value sources is important and worth fostering. Totalitarianism,
however, can result when high-level value sources (i.e., those value sources further
away from the individual-for example, political parties, states, nations, and the
international community) become too thick and squeeze out the possibility of diver-
sity among individual citizens. A proper communitarian theory will therefore take into
account the various competences of different social institutions to promote the diver-
sity of values that are constitutive of our subjectivity, while simultaneously bearing
in mind that these value sources ought to be thickest at the lowest levels. This analysis
will conclude that schools are uniquely well situated to promote those values held
at the society-wide level. This will combine with the democratic intuition that, in a
democratic society, decisions about the inculcation of social values can only legiti-
mately be made by democratic means. The conclusion will be that parents and courts
are unjustified in interfering with social reproduction through schooling."
Board Undoes Stand on Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at A14.
9 See Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational
Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YAIEL. &POL'Y REv. 113, 117-27 (1996)
(noting that, because it was not expected that the federal government would play a role in
education, founding history gives little guidance on the appropriate application of the First
Amendment to schooling).
'o See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUC-
THON 32-45 (1998) (noting the federalist contours of the religion clauses).
" This conclusion may appear odd to those who see Yoder as a fundamentally communi-
tarian decision. See, e.g., Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education
Toward Religion: Why Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion Clauses,
19 U. HAw. L. REv. 697, 749 (1997); James D. Gordon III, Wisconsin v. Yoder and Religious
Liberty, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1237, 1239 (1996); Robert Justin Lipkin, Religious Justification in
the American Communitarian Republic, 25 CAP. U.L. REv. 765 (1996); L. Scott Smith,
"Religion-Neutral" Jurisprudence: An Examination of Its Meanings and End, 13 WM. &
MARY BILRTS. J. 841, 871-72 (2005); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew A Circle That Shut
Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV.
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However, the democratic-communitarian analysis produces a second, equally impor-
tant conclusion. When making democratic decisions, the conscientious citizen and
legislator are bound to resist totalitarian tendencies by imposing the minimum re-
straints necessary to ensure the transmission of important communal values at each
level. In other words, voters should very seriously consider enacting the kinds of
exemptions sought by Jonas Yoder and his co-defendants, and they should decide
not to enact those exemptions only if they come to the conclusion that the exemp-
tions will interfere with instruction necessary for the education of democratic citizens.
This democratic-communitarian theory is best explored against the background
of the competing analyses of the Yoder problem heretofore offered by scholars.
These competing analyses have raised problems and concerns that must be addressed
by any new entrant into the field. This Article thus begins by responding to each
of the four main lines of existing scholarship on the Yoder question.
In Part I, I examine the case from liberal neutrality against Yoder and the case
from liberal neutrality in favor of Yoder. I conclude that each of these positions is
inadequate. The Yoder opponent cannot escape the fact that there is no value-neutral
curriculum, and the Yoder supporter cannot abide the logical consequences of his
position-that all laws, not merely educational ones, should be neutral among com-
peting conceptions of the good. The arguments from liberal neutrality are inadequate
because they both import other, non-neutral values sub rosa in an attempt to make
it appear that neutral reflection leads to their preferred outcome.
In Part 11, 1 consider the parentalist case in favor of Yoder. I reject the parentalist
case as incomplete because it fails to consider the complex web of social relations
that constitutes a child's value set. It is only by misunderstanding the complexity of
social relations that parentalist theorists can conclude that the parents are the only
legitimate source of values for the child or that compulsory public schooling will stifle
social dissent.
In Part Im, I turn to the republican case against Yoder. I conclude that the repub-
lican argument creates unjustified impositions on democratic decision-making. What
it masks as curricular conditions necessary for democracy are, in fact, simply the
entrenchment of the republican's own curricular preferences.
With the ground thus cleared and the necessary ideas and objections on the table,
I turn in Part IV to an explication of the democratic-communitarian alternative. This
Part will lay out the communitarian and democratic insights discussed above and
show how they combine to provide an answer to the Yoder problem. It will then
consider objections and conclude that they do not seriously threaten the democratic-
communitarian analysis.
L. REv. 581,648, 663 (1993). However, I understand the central insight of communitarianism
to be the recognition that individuals are constituted by multiple value sources and that this
diversity of value sources is worth fostering. On this understanding, communitarianism does
not privilege the local over the global; rather, it recognizes an important place for each. See
infra Part IV.A.
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I. THE INADEQUACY OF LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
Advocates of liberal neutrality-the idea that the state must be neutral among
competing conceptions of the good-have come down on both sides of the Yoder
debate. In this Part, I shall demonstrate that liberal neutrality simply does not work
as a grounding for either position. It is impossible as a grounding for Yoder opponents
because there is no value-neutral curriculum. It is impossible for Yoder supporters
because, taken seriously, it would require that religious believers be exempt from all
laws which conflict with their religious beliefs-a position which is incompatible
with any conception of a functioning society under law. Attempts to limit the principle
to a requirement of neutrality among reasonable conceptions of the good fail because
they rely upon thick conceptions of reasonableness-that is, conceptions based on
dominant social norms. "Reasonableness" thus serves primarily to disguise the under-
lying judgment that some conceptions of the good are better than others. This judg-
ment may be correct, but it is not neutral.
A. The Inadequacy of Liberal Neutrality for Yoder Opponents
In 1983, the Hawkins County, Tennessee Board of Education adopted a set of
texts published by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston designed to encourage "critical read-
ing."" Soon thereafter, Vicki Frost, a born-again Christian, noticed a short story in-
volving mental telepathy in her daughter's sixth grade textbook. 3 At the request of
Frost and other parents with religious objections to the texts, the principals of one mid-
dle school and two elementary schools allowed their children to opt for an alternative
reading program.'4 These students would leave the classroom during reading time
and work in other rooms using older textbooks.'" However, the school board quickly
put a stop to this practice and voted unanimously to require all students to use the
Holt texts. 6 Shortly thereafter, fourteen parents and seventeen children filed suit in
federal court, asserting that the school board's action violated their First Amend-
ment right to the free exercise of their religion.'7 The district court held for the plain-
tiffs and entered an injunction prohibiting the school board from requiring the students
to read from the Holt texts and ordering that objecting students be excused from the
normal reading class and given space elsewhere to read alternative texts. 8
12 See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (6th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
"3 Id. at 1060.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1060-61.
IS Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schs., 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1203 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
2006]
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In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit thus faced
the question of "whether a governmental requirement that a person be exposed to ideas
he or she finds objectionable on religious grounds constitutes a burden on the free
exercise of that person's religion as forbidden by the First Amendment."' 9 Chief Judge
Lively, for the court, held that it did not. The court emphasized that "exposure to objec-
tionable material is what the plaintiffs objected to,"20 because they had not presented
any evidence that students were required to affirm their belief or disbelief of any
ideas or practices mentioned in the texts. The court held that
[t]he requirement that students read the assigned materials and
attend reading classes, in the absence of a showing that this partic-
ipation entailed affirmation or denial of a religious belief, or perfor-
mance or non-performance of a religious exercise or practice, does
not place an unconstitutional burden on the students' free exercise
of religion.2'
It went on to quote approvingly from a Ninth Circuit opinion to the effect that
governmental actions that merely offend or cast doubt on religious
beliefs do not on that account violate free exercise. An actual
burden on the profession or exercise of religion is required. In
short, distinctions must be drawn between those governmental
actions that actually interfere with the exercise of religion, and
those that merely require or result in exposure to attitudes and
outlooks at odds with perspectives prompted by religion.22
In essence, mere exposure to ideas cannot possibly "burden" or "interfere with" the
free exercise of religion in the way that forcing a child to engage in practices incon-
sistent with her religious belief does.
In a perceptive article, Nomi Maya Stolzenberg has demonstrated the untenability
of this position. 23 "Critical reading" and "critical reasoning" are themselves practices
-practices which may conflict with religious beliefs. Critical reasoning teaches
children to weigh different points of view and to use their cognitive faculties to choose
the best one. The fundamentalist parent might well reply that reasoning about certain
questions is an offensive practice-certain religious commands are meant to be obeyed,
'9 827 F.2d at 1063.
20 id.
21 Id. at 1065.
22 Id. at 1068 (quoting Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1543 (9th Cir.
1985)).
23 Stolzenberg, supra note 11.
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not weighed.24 The Mozert court argued that there was no burden on the child's reli-
gious belief because the child "would be free to give the Biblical interpretation of the
material" when called on in class. 2 As Stolzenberg aptly retorted, this is "no answer
to the parents' concern that the students should not be free, but rather should be
trained in correct biblical interpretation."26 If one's religious beliefs demand unques-
tioned obedience to authority, then critical thinking is clearly a practice which burdens
those beliefs. Having been forced to participate in the activity of critical thinking,
children can no longer offer unquestioned obedience. Even if they come to the same
conclusion, they will have come via a different route, and that surely has theological
implications. The Mozert court thus "missed the essential point that, to its opponents,
the objective study of religion, and objective approaches to knowledge in general,
are quintessentially secular humanist activities."27 In short, the idea that there is such
a thing as neutral exposure to an idea is fundamentally incoherent. All exposure is
value-laden, if only with the value that exposure to ideas is good.
The Mozert case is especially important because one of the leading liberal oppo-
nents of educational religious reproduction, Bruce Ackerman, makes substantially
similar arguments.28 In Ackerman's theory, the goal of liberal education is "to provide
the child with access to the wide range of cultural materials that he may find useful
in developing his own moral ideals and patterns of life."29 No one has a right con-
sciously to attempt to instill beliefs in children.3" First and foremost, this means that
we must reject "any effort by any power holder to inculcate an uncritical acceptance
of any conception of the good life."'" Instead, "what is required is a cultural envi-
ronment in which the child may define his own ideals with a recognition of the full
range of his moral freedom."32 The confrontation set up between children and their
parents' way of life is not only to be accepted; it is to be relished:
It is only by questioning the seeming certainties of his early moral
environment that the child can begin to glimpse the larger world
24 Id. at 612.
2 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069.
26 Stolzenberg, supra note 11, at 613.
27 Id. at 614.
28 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
29 Id. at 155-56.
30 See id. at 139 ("Such horticultural imagery has no place in a liberal theory of education.
We have no right to look upon future citizens as if we were master gardeners who can tell the
difference between a pernicious weed and a beautiful flower. A system of liberal education
provides children with a sense of the very different lives that could be theirs-so that, as they
approach maturity, they have the cultural materials available to build lives equal to their
evolving conceptions of the good.").
3' Id. at 163.
32 Id. at 162.
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of value that may be his for the asking. More generally, the liberal
educator's methods of doubt, imagination, and independence
must necessarily come in conflict with whatever moral ideals
happen to dominate society at large. It is this unending conflict
that makes the institutionalization of liberal education- in
"schools" relatively insulated from the rest of society-a matter of
the first practical importance.3"
Ackerman insists that his vision truly is a neutral one: "[T]he liberal state is not
committed to a system of liberal education because it wishes to indoctrinate children
in one vision of the good rather than another." '34
Just as the Mozert court's claim to neutrality was a fagade hiding value-laden
choices, so too is Ackerman's. His liberal education rules out conceptions of the good
life that involve unquestioning acceptance of moral truths. It immerses the child in
a universe in which doubt, imagination, and independence are inculcated at every
turn. Indeed, parents are expressly forbidden from working at counter-purposes to the
liberal educator.3 5 That means that the values of obedience to authority, unimagi-
nativeness, and dependence are heavily burdened. Ackerman disguises his value
choices behind the language of procedure-his liberal educator is only teaching chil-
dren how to think, not what to think. But methodologies inevitably come laden with
substantive implications. Ackerman cannot escape the fact that his liberal education
indoctrinates children in one vision of the good rather than another.36
Many will no doubt agree with Ackerman's value choices-that doubt, imagi-
nation, and independence are better values to inculcate than their opposites. But that
is neither here nor there. What is important for our purposes is that Ackerman's
claim that an education based on these principles is somehow value-neutral is false.
Ackerman's vision is not neutral between competing conceptions of the good.
Indeed, the lesson to be drawn from our analysis of Mozert and Ackerman is that
no educational system which aims to curtail parental religious reproduction can truly
be neutral between competing conceptions of the good. Liberal neutrality is an
inadequate basis upon which to attack Yoder. In the next sub-part, we will consider
whether liberal neutrality can be an adequate basis upon which to sustain Yoder.
33 id.
34 Id. at 159.
35 Id. at 156.
36 For similar critiques of Ackerman's claim to educational neutrality, see Stephen G.
Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937, 947-51
(1996), and Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him! ": Freedom of
Religion in the Post-modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REv. 163, 179-80.
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B. The Inadequacy of Liberal Neutrality for Yoder Supporters
Liberal neutrality is inadequate for Yoder supporters because, if taken seriously,
neutrality would require religious exemptions from state laws against physical abuse
-a conclusion that even the most staunch advocates of a neutrality-based approach
have been unwilling to embrace. An example will prove helpful: Female genital muti-
lation is a horrific practice.3 Under federal law, the performance of female circumci-
sion on a minor can result in a prison sentence of up to five years,3" in addition to
whatever penalties apply under state law.39 The federal law explicitly provides that,
"no account shall be taken of the effect on the person on whom the operation is to
be performed of any belief on the part of that person, or any other person, that the oper-
ation is required as a matter of custom or ritual."'' Plainly, this law is constitutional
-indeed, a database search suggests that it has never even been challenged on the
grounds that it restricts religious liberty.
Richard Garnett suggests that religiously motivated physical abuse presents an
easy case because "[wie know what physical or medical harm looks like."'" Indeed,
"[i]f someone were to assert... that serious physical injury or death to a child were
not a harm to be avoided (as opposed to claiming that, even though harmful, it must
be accepted reluctantly), that view could, I think, be ruled out of the conversation as
simply unreasonable." '42 By distinguishing it as an easy case, Garnett attempts to draw
a distinction between physical abuse and fuzzier claims of civic or educational harm.
These latter types of harm are "unavoidably contested," according to Garnett, and
" See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785,789,795-96 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that female genital mutilation .of minors constitutes past persecution for the purposes of
asylum laws).
38 18 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2000).
31 State assault and child abuse statutes would clearly apply. Additionally, many states have
rough counterparts to the federal law discussed here. See, e.g., CAL. PENALCODE § 273.4 (West
1999) (adding one year imprisonment for the practice); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 780 (2005)
(making the practice a felony); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-27 (supp. 2005) (punishing the practice
with between five and twenty years imprisonment); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-34
(West 2005) (making the practice a felony); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-601 (Lexis-
Nexis 2005) (prohibiting the practice); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2245 (West 2003) (same);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.85 (McKinney 2004) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-36-01
(2005) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.207 (2003) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-110
(2005) (same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 167.001 (Vernon supp. 2006) (same);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D--3a (LexisNexis 2005) (punishing the practice with between two
and ten years imprisonment); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.35 (West 2005) (making the practice
illegal). None of these laws allows an exception for religiously motivated mutilation.
40 18 U.S.C. § 116(c) (2000).
41 Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and
Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 118 (2000).
42 Id. at 137 n.129.
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therefore "should not be a permissible basis for government intervention or second-
guessing."43 Much will, therefore, turn on whether Garnett's distinction holds water.
When Garnett writes that the assertion that physical injury to a child is not a
harm is "simply unreasonable," he cannot have in mind a standard "thin" conception
of rationality, under which any action that efficiently conduces to the actor's desired
goal is rational. After all, one can perfectly plausibly conceive of a situation in which
parents believe that circumcising their daughter (or, for that matter, sacrificing her
life) is an affirmative good because it brings her closer to God. Indeed, one presumes
that such parents would insist that they were not "mutilating," "injuring," or "harming"
their daughter-they were enabling her to reach her full potential by fulfilling her
religious roles and duties. Circumcising their daughter may be the most efficient, or
even the only, means of accomplishing this goal, and thus it may be thinly rational.
Gamett, then, must be relying on a thicker conception of reasonableness, one that im-
plicitly relies on dominant social norms.
Indeed, Garnett' s reliance on the language of reason is obfuscatory-religiously
motivated physical abuse presents not irrational desire for ill fortune to befall one's
child but rather a collision between two incompatible nomoi." In the nomos of society
at large, genital mutilation is unacceptable; in the nomos of the insular religious com-
munity, it is desirable, perhaps mandatory. In denying the reasonableness of the claim
that the physical abuse of the child should be celebrated, Garnett simply privileges
the dominant social nomos over the insular religious nomos. Put differently, Garnett
has not discovered unanimity on the question of religiously motivated physical abuse.
No such unanimity exists because one person's "abuse" is another person's "ritual,"
"practice," or "duty."'45 Instead, Garnett has created such unanimity by fiat-anyone
who disagrees is "unreasonable" and therefore can be "ruled out of the conversation."
This is not to suggest that Garnett is wrong. Indeed, I believe that he is quite
right, and I take it for granted that laws prohibiting religiously motivated physical
abuse do not violate religious freedom. We must, however, be clear about what we
are doing. To repeat: in refusing to allow religiously motivated physical abuse, we are
privileging the norms of society at large over the conflicting norms of an insular reli-
gious community. That is, we are rejecting the political liberal conception of absolute
state neutrality between competing conceptions of the good."
41 Id. at 138.
44 See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (exploring the structure of our shared normative worlds).
4' For a rich literary account of the clash between incompatible nomoi--one of which affir-
matively celebrates a death and the other of which is aghast-see WOLE SOYINKA, DEATH
AND THE KING'S HORSEMAN (1975).
6 Garnett, supra note 41, at 137 n.129.
7 The supporter of liberal neutrality may be tempted to reply simply that violence is
different-that a monopoly on the use of violence is precisely what defines the state, and
therefore, of course, remains the exclusive preserve of the state. In contrast, the advocate of
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This is hardly a radical conclusion; a number of liberal theorists have argued
against a strict political liberalism. Waldron has insisted that "[olne does not, as it
were, have to be neutral all the way down."" That is, he regards neutrality
not only as a value that legislators ought to be constrained by,
but also as a value that they ought to enforce (on other people
attempting to exercise power in a nonneutral way). Another way
of putting this is to say simply: in his own behavior but also in
regard to the behavior of the people under him, the legislator is
not to be neutral about neutrality.49
Dworkin has argued along similar lines: "Liberalism cannot be based on skep-
ticism. Its constitutive morality provides that human beings must be treated as equals
by their government, not because there is no right and wrong in political morality,
but because that is what is right."50
Even Rawls limited political liberalism's agnosticism between comprehensive
doctrines to reasonable comprehensive doctrines.5 Indeed, Abner Greene criticizes
Rawls for advancing a comprehensive liberalism in the guise of political liberalism.
52
Greene professes to prefer a true political liberalism, which "acknowledges the equal
neutrality might assert, education may, but need not, be a state function, and the state must be
neutral among competing conceptions of the good in areas that do not cut to the very essence
of what a state is.
This argument fails on two levels. First, it begs the question: the parents who circumcise
their daughters would insist that they are not employing violence at all. They are performing
a medical procedure and a socio-religious ritual. Of course, the procedure may cause some
pain, but that does not differentiate it from myriad other medical procedures (e.g., surgery)
or social rituals (e.g., playing sports) that we allow parents to force their children to undergo.
To assert that female circumcision is different from education because female circumcision
is violent (as opposed to painful) is to deny that female circumcision is beneficial to the child,
and that denial is already non-neutral.
Second, most liberals are willing to suspend neutrality in some clearly non-violent cases
as well. For example, few liberals argue that the state has an obligation to be neutral between
racists and non-racists. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
(upholding a denial of tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code to a school because
of its racially discriminatory admissions standards); see also Stephen L. Carter, The Free
Exercise Thereof, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1627, 1647-52 (1997) (suggesting that our
acceptance of Bob Jones represents a very non-neutral "shared conclusion that God-this
real, extant, and transcendent Creator-God--does not in fact will racial prejudice").
48 JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS 147 (1993).
49 Id. at 157.
So RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 203 (1985).
5 JOHN RAWLS, POurCALLIBERAuSM 44 (1993). Rawls has an expansive, but by no means
unbounded, conception of which comprehensive doctrines are reasonable. See id. at 58-66.
52 Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground-A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls
and Life's Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 646, 667-71 (1994).
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moral capacity of citizens to pursue their conceptions of the good .... [E]ven those
citizens whose theories of the good are not themselves agnostic in this way."53 The
devil, however, is in the footnotes, where Greene acknowledges that, "[o]bviously,
we cannot grant exemptions [from generally applicable laws] in all cases-for ex-
ample, we would not exempt someone from murder laws so that she might engage
in the human sacrifice that her religion commands."54 It is unclear how Greene can
claim to acknowledge the equal moral capacity of the person who is unable to carry
out the demands of her religion because they involve murder. Clearly, the blanket
prohibition of murder, without exception for religious sacrifice, is a claim that con-
ceptions of the good which do not involve human sacrifice are better than those which
do. Greene's liberalism, thus, may be thinner than Rawls's, but it is not a true political
liberalism because it is not neutral between all competing conceptions of the good.
It draws content from some value other than neutrality, and this other value remains
unidentified and undefended.
Put differently, Greene and Garnett both encounter the same problem. They both
want to avoid privileging the nomos of society at large over the nomos of the insular
religious community, but each is uncomfortable with some of the implications of
that position. Specifically, they are uncomfortable with the fact that it means that reli-
giously motivated physical abuse cannot be punished under generally applicable laws.
Each, therefore, attempts to solve this problem by fiat: Garnett attempts to rule the
justification of physical abuse "out of the conversation as simply unreasonable,"55
while Greene simply notes that, "[o]bviously" exceptions cannot be made for human
sacrifice. 6 Both statements are tucked away in footnotes, and both are attempts to
sidestep the inevitable conclusion. The state must privilege some conceptions of the
good over others. The state must tell some insular religious communities that some
of their practices-practices like female genital mutilation or human sacrifice-are
bad and must be stopped. This cannot be justified on the grounds of neutrality, and
Garnett and Greene have failed to articulate a non-neutral principle which allows them
to disfavor the practices of some of these communities.
Moreover, Gamett and Greene have failed to articulate a principled dividing line
between physical harm and other types of harm. Gamett appeals to consensus on the
harmfulness of physical harm, but, as we have seen, that consensus is manufactured
by Garnett' s "reasonableness" test. Greene simply appeals to the "obviousness" of
punishing human sacrificers without attempting to articulate an underlying principle.
The language of "compelling state interests" cannot rescue Garnett and Greene. Like
the language of "reasonableness," it serves only to disguise an underlying (non-neutral)
preference for one conception of the good (the "compelling state interest" in the bodily
" Id. at 671.
" Id. at 672 n.135.
55 Garnett, supra note 41, at 137 n.129.
56 Greene, supra note 52, at 672 n.135.
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integrity of those within the state's jurisdiction) over another (the insular religious or
cultural interest-no doubt seen by its practitioners as compelling-in performing their
rituals). We may agree or disagree with the preference, but we should recognize that
neutrality has nothing to do with it.
Having seen that liberal neutrality fails both opponents of Yoder (like Ackerman
and the Mozert court) and supporters of Yoder (like Garnett and Greene), it remains
to consider non-neutral arguments. In the next two Parts, we will consider the paren-
talist arguments used by Yoder supporters and the republican arguments put forward
by Yoder opponents.
H. THE INCOMPLETENESS OF PARENTALISM
Those who support Yoder on non-neutral grounds fall into the camp that I will
broadly refer to as parentalists. These thinkers assert that it is better for parents to
control their children's education, not because parental control means that the state is
neutral between competing conceptions of the good, but rather because parental control
leads to better outcomes than state control.5 7 Parentalist thinkers frequently draw inspi-
ration from the Supreme Court's decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.58 This Part
will thus begin by examining Pierce and suggesting that a different grounding for
the decision could assuage parentalists' worries without asserting a sweeping new
fundamental right, as the actual decision did. I will then analyze the arguments of two
leading parentalist thinkers, Stephen Gilles and Stephen Carter, and suggest that they
are incomplete because they fail to take into account the complexity of the web of
social value sources.
A. An Alternative Pierce
Pierce involved a challenge brought by two private schools, one secular and one
Catholic, to Oregon's Compulsory Education Act, which was enacted by ballot initia-
tive in 1922 and was to go into effect in 1926.'9 The Act made it a misdemeanor for any
parent or guardian to keep his child out of public school.' Its purpose was to "compel
general attendance at public schools by normal children, between eight and sixteen,
who have not completed the eighth grade., 61 The Court, per Justice McReynolds,
struck down the law, holding that it
17 See Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as if Family Matters, 78 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Carter, Religious]; Gilles, supra note 36.
58 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
'9 id. at 530.
60 Id. at 530n.1.
61 Id. at 531.
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unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control .... The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all gov-
ernments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruc-
tion from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.62
Pierce was, of course, handed down at the height of the Lochner era, and one might
be tempted to think that its sweeping assertion of parents' "fundamental" right to direct
the upbringing of their children is as tenuous as other substantive due process cases
of the time. Parentalist defenders of the case, however, point to the history of the
Oregon law at issue as evidence of the decision's wisdom.63
As Professor Carter has persuasively demonstrated, the compulsory education
laws of the mid-nineteenth century were a reaction to an influx of immigrants from
Europe. 6' These immigrants brought with them "what were routinely referred to as
foreign religions, a term that included, basically, Roman Catholicism and Judaism."65
Compulsory education laws were designed to "Protestantize" the children of these
immigrants: "Many states established their schools with the clear and often openly
stated intention of wiping out the 'foreign religions."66 '.The ... compulsory schooling
laws had a decidedly anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic bias."67 When many Catholic par-
ents responded by exiting the public school system and putting their children in
parochial schools, the voters of Oregon adopted the Compulsory Education Act "with
a clear intention of making it impossible for the Catholic schools to exist. '6 Carter
concludes that "[u]sing the history, the Pierce holding can be rewritten thus: the state
may not use its power to compel education as a tool for destroying a religion. Phrased
this way, the Pierce rule is one, presumably, that all of us can stand up and cheer. 69
Indeed, one might go even further than Carter and think that the proper holding
in the case would simply have been this: the state may not target a religion. A law ani-
mated by hostility toward a certain religious group or groups cannot stand. Phrased
62 Id. at 534-35.
63 See generally Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce,
70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALLL. REv. 1194 (1997) [hereinafter Carter, Parents] (defending
the Pierce decision).
64 Carter, Religious, supra note 57, at 4.
65 id.
66 Id. at 4-5.
67 Id. at 5.
6 Id. at 6; see also Carter, Parents, supra note 63, at 1200-02.
69 Carter, Parents, supra note 63, at 1204.
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this way, Pierce starts to look a lot like Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah.7" In that case, the city of Hialeah, Florida passed a number of ordinances that
prohibited animal sacrifice.7 The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye asserted that these
ordinances were clearly directed at its Santeria religious practices and therefore
violated its free exercise rights.72 The Court, per Justice Kennedy, held that
if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and
it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is nar-
rowly tailored to advance that interest. There are, of course, many
ways of demonstrating that the object or purpose of a law is the
suppression of religion or religious conduct. To determine the ob-
ject of a law, we must begin with its text, for the minimum require-
ment of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law
lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a
secular meaning discernable from the language or context. Peti-
tioners contend that three of the ordinances fail this test of facial
neutrality because they use the words "sacrifice" and "ritual," words
with strong religious connotations. We agree that these words are
consistent with the claim of facial discrimination, but the argument
is not conclusive. The words "sacrifice" and "ritual" have a reli-
gious origin, but current use admits also of secular meanings....
We reject the contention advanced by the city that our inquiry
must end with the text of the laws at issue. Facial neutrality is
not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establish-
ment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination.... Official
action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot
be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial
neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against govern-
mental hostility which is masked as well as overt.73
The Court looked at the structure of the entire set of ordinances, the circumstances
surrounding their adoption, and their overbreadth for achieving their purported
70 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
71 Id. at 526-28.
72 Id. at 528.
73 Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted). The "neutrality" referred to by the Court is not the
liberal neutrality rejected above. See supra Part I. It is instead the requirement that a law
prohibiting conduct cannot prohibit that conduct because it is a religious practice. The
justification for the law cannot make reference to the conduct's religious significance. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). This "neutrality" does not give rise to the
same problems as the liberal neutrality rejected above.
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legitimate state interests" to conclude that "[t]he ordinances had as their object the
suppression of religion."" Two members of the Court also looked to the ordinances'
legislative history and found evidence of religious antagonism. 7 6 Because the ordi-
nances "had an impermissible object," were not generally applicable, and were not
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, the Court struck them down."
In essence, the lesson of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye is that the state may not
pass laws motivated by antagonism toward a religious group, and the courts may go
behind the text of a law to discover whether such antagonism is present.
I submit (albeit anachronistically) that Pierce should have been decided under the
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye standard. What is compelling in Carter's account
of the background of Pierce is that the law was motivated by religious antagonism: the
voters of Oregon were hostile to Catholics, and therefore, passed a law intended to make
it harder for Catholics to practice their faith.78 It is the animus-the intent-that was
impermissible, not the effect." A 1925 Court applying the Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye standard could have gone behind the facial neutrality of the Compulsory
Education Act, found the religious animus underlying it, and struck down the law
on that ground. In short, the disturbing facts behind Pierce give us every reason to
cheer the principles relied upon in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, but they do
notjustify the sweeping parentalist rights announced in Pierce itself. It will take more
than just those facts to lead us to the parentalist conclusion. In the next two sub-parts,
we shall examine the arguments of two leading parentalist theorists to see if there
are arguments, independent of Pierce, that prove more persuasive.
B. Stephen Gilles's Monism
In his Parentalist Manifesto, Stephen Gilles makes three basic arguments for par-
entalism. First, the state's interest in curricular specifics is sharply limited, and beyond
those limits, the fact of religious pluralism "obliges society to rely on persuasive means
to achieve its educational aims."8 Second, "parents are more likely to pursue the
child's best interest as they define it than is the state to pursue the child's best interest
" Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534-40.
71 Id. at 542.
76 Id. at 540-42.
77 Id. at 524.
78 See Carter, Religious, supra note 57, at 4-6.
71 In this regard, the appeal by two Justices to equal protection-based reasoning in Church
ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye was especially appropriate. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
508 U.S. at 540-42. It is a bedrock principle of constitutional equal protection jurisprudence
that the inquiry focuses on racially discriminatory intent, not racially disparate impact.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and
Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203 (1996) (arguing that laws which
single out a group for disfavored treatment violate the principles of the Attainder Clause).
80 Gilles, supra note 36, at 940.
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as the state defines it."'" And third, "individuals have... [a] fundamental interest in
nurturing their children and in being nurtured by their parents. ' 2 None of these
arguments is persuasive.
Gilles's first argument sounds in the ideal of liberal neutrality rejected above.83
He seeks a "minimalist understanding of liberal education on which reasonable people
would reach consensus." 4 Again, reasonableness does all of the work here. He
asserts that "[s]urely a consensus exists in our society that a way of life is unreason-
able if it denies that health, speech, or reason are human goods under ordinary cir-
cumstances." 5 Does any such consensus really exist? We might command wide-
spread support for the proposition that health is better than unhealth under "ordinary
circumstances," but any attempt to define "ordinary circumstances" would lead to signi-
ficant trouble. The parent whose religious beliefs demand that his young daughter
be circumcised may prefer to subject his daughter to serious health risks rather than
the risk of God's anger.8 6 The terminally ill cancer patient may prefer a more rapid
deterioration of health to undergoing painful chemotherapy. Still others might prefer
to run serious health risks (or to allow their children to run such risks) rather than
make use of modern medical science. 7 Those in the Deaf movement disagree that
"speech"-at least as we normally use the word-is better than the alternative. 8
There may, likewise, be those who believe that reason is antithetical to faith and
therefore should play no part, or a sharply limited part, in education.
Gilles achieves "consensus" on these issues only by ruling out those who opt for the
alternative as "unreasonable." 9 His conception of reasonableness, however, appears
to be free-floating-it cannot be grounded in neutrality, for neutrality is not meant
to have a substantive component. It cannot be grounded in consensus, for, as we have
seen, its role in Gilles's theory is to prevent some voices from counting '-this
would be the height of question-begging. Where, then, does it come from?9' If no
81 Id.
82 id.
83 See supra Part I.B.
84 Gilles, supra note 36, at 984.
85 Id. at 985 (footnote omitted).
86 See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785,789 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting the health risks
frequently attendant on female genital mutilation).
87 See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988) (denying a mother's motion
to dismiss charges of involuntary manslaughter, felony child-endangerment, and child neglect
because she treated her daughter's acute meningitis with prayer rather than seeking medical
help), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
88 See Liza Mundy, A World of Their Own, WASH. POST MAG., Mar. 31, 2002, at 22
(reporting the story of deaf parents who want their children to be deaf as well).
89 Gilles, supra note 36, at 986-87 (suggesting that parents' views should be discounted
when they are unreasonable).
9 Id.
9' The arbitrariness of Gilles's view is highlighted by the fact that he considers "views
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satisfactory answer can be given-and none is forthcoming from Gilles's article-then
we must dispense with even the "minimalist" educational requirements. And as we
have seen above, once one takes this position, then one cannot argue in a principled
way for enforcing laws against religiously motivated physical abuse, either. 2 Gilles,
like Garnett and Greene, appears unwilling to go down this road.
Gilles's second and third arguments depart from liberal neutrality and attempt
to provide non-neutral arguments for parentalism. The first of these arguments is that
parents are more likely to pursue the child's best interest as they define it than the
state is to pursue it as it defines it.9 3 It is unclear, however, why the child's best inter-
est is the sole criterion of a good education. Is it not an equally plausible position that
education should aim at producing a good society, and when the social interests clash
with the individual interest of the child, the social interests should (at least sometimes)
prevail? Gilles replies that the "revealed priorities of most people in liberal soci-
eties ... [are] family first, citizenship second.... History teaches that conscious fa-
milial reproduction, not.., conscious social reproduction, is a basic human need
for most people in most societies."'94 Gilles presents no empirical evidence for this
claim, but, even assuming that it is correct, it ignores a significant collective action
problem. Suppose a citizen believes that the goal of education should be civic first, indi-
vidual second, but this citizen also recognizes that educating her own child for citi-
zenship will not lead to a good society unless a critical mass of other parents also
educate their children for citizenship. This is a classic prisoner's dilemma, and the
rational citizen-parent may opt to educate her own child in the child's best interest
because she recognizes the irrationality of harming her child in exchange for no social
gain at all. Her "revealed priorities" would appear to be: child first, society second.
But if she could vote on the issue with the result of the vote to be binding society-
wide, she would vote for civic education first, even if it meant some harm to her child.
By and large, this is how parents vote-local school boards are not rife with parentalist
members promising to allow full parental autonomy over education. In any case, the
revealed preferences of parents in their everyday lives are more evidence of what
calling for the oppression and subordination of women" to be evidently "unreasonable," see
id. at 987, but views which merely regard women as "unequal helpers of men" are not, see
id. at 998. It is left unexplained what principles allow him to draw such fine distinctions.
2 See supra Part I.B.
9 Gilles, supra note 36, at 953. Gilles claims that the best interest of the child is, in fact, a
"neutral principle." Id. at 951-53. However, he makes no attempt to prove this assertion, and
it cannot be taken seriously. Clearly, the best interests of the child standard is not neutral as be-
tween a position that asserts that the child should be educated to be the best possible citizen
and the position that the child should be educated in his own best interests. These two positions
might sometimes conflict, and it is simply not credible to claim that the best interests of the
child standard is neutral between them. I shall therefore assume that Gilles meant simply to
advocate the best interests of the child as the best standard, rather than as a neutral one.
'4 Id. at 995-97.
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parents can do (individual parents can act in the child's best interests; they cannot
singlehandedly act to reproduce the culture) than what they want done.
This leads to a related critique of Gilles's second argument. Even if he is correct
that the best interests of the child is the right standard, and even if he is correct that
parents have the stronger incentive to act in the child's best interests, incentives are
only half of the story. The other half is resources, most importantly the resource of
knowledge. Parents may want more desperately than teachers to act in their child's
best interests, but teachers may be better than parents at knowing what those interests
are and how to act in pursuance of them. Gilles cannot claim to promote the best
interests of the child while refusing to consider which actor has the best access to
the resources necessary for promoting those interests. 9
5
Gilles's third argument might be seen as an indirect response to this critique. By
arguing that there is something fundamental to human dignity in the transmission of
values from parent to child,' Gilles might implicitly be undermining the premise of
the resource objection. That is, he might be saying that it is incomprehensible to
talk about the state being better than parents at knowing or pursuing the child's best
interests, because part of the child's best interests lies precisely in receiving that edu-
cation chosen by her parents. Gilles argues that the nurturing relationship between
parents and children is central to our human flourishing and that shaping the child's
values is central to this nurturing relationship.' As parents, "we wish our children to
share in the good life as we (diversely) conceive it, to flourish as we understand human
flourishing. To these ends, we seek to pass on to them not only our fundamental values
and beliefs, but also the character to live in accordance with them." 98 Moreover, parents
want their educational authority to be absolute: "[Clonscientious parents conceive
their educational obligations comprehensively."9 9 Noting that it would restrict free
speech rights specifically and liberal toleration generally for the state to forbid parents
from attempting to pass on certain values to their children,"° Gilles asserts that any
9' Gilles concludes that "liberalism treats adults as self-governing in part because they have
the best incentives to act in their own best interests. Consequently, because individual parents
have the best incentives to act in their children's perceived best interests, they have a claim to
govern their children (and their children's education) that is closely analogous to their claim
to govern themselves." Id. at 959-60. By ignoring the question of resources, Gilles has left the
best interests of the child standard behind. Suppose we agree that parents have the best incen-
tives to act in the child's best interests, but, because of resource differentials, we think that the
state actually does further the child's interests better than the parent. In this scenario, Gilles's
conclusion amounts simply to a claim that parents ought to have the same dominion over their
children as they do over themselves. Gilles presents no argument for this claim, and it is
certainly highly contested. After all, adults have the right to mutilate themselves.
96 Id. at 962-67.
97 id.
98 Id. at 965.
99 Id. at 966.
'00 Id. at 967-68.
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state interference in parental value transmission presents the same problem: "[T]he
paradigm of the state battling with minority parents to win the child's allegiance is
both subversive of parental nurturing and authority, and counter to the widely held
and reasonable judgment.. : that the child needs to receive a coherent education
shaped by some controlling conception of the good."''
Gilles's leap from the value of the parent-child nurturing relationship to the
illegitimacy of anything subversive of that relationship is a long one. Our values
result from myriad sources and relationships, and it is unrealistic to think that one
of those sources -albeit a very important one-could shut out the rest, even if it
wanted to.'0 2 Moreover, Gilles does not seem to consider the possibility that there
can be conflicting goods-that is, that the parent-child nurturing relationship can
be a good but so can the relationship between the child and other sources of value.
Gilles's value monism stands in stark contrast to our experience of everyday life, in
which we are constantly forced to choose between incompatible and incommensu-
rable goods. 0 3 Perhaps the parent-child nurturing relationship is a good that should
be fostered by some means, while other relationships are goods that should be
fostered by other means.°" Neither will completely predominate over the other, but
the mere fact that conscientious parents conceive their educational obligations
comprehensively does not mean that conscientious citizens might not opt for some
sort of compromise.
In short, once Gilles finishes his argument from liberal neutrality, he turns to
arguments based on the child's best interests and the parents' interest in nurturing
the child. He treats these interests as absolutes, admitting of no compromise with
alternative values,0 5 but his reasons for so thoroughly privileging them are
unpersuasive. He gives us no reason to think that there might not be a broader
social interest that would justify curtailing strong parentalist rights.
C. Stephen Carter's Dissentism
Stephen Carter offers an alternative parentalist rationale that avoids the particular
monism which plagues Gilles' s account. Carter acknowledges that there is a strong
101 Id. at 969.
"O Children must leave the house sometime, and this means, at the very least, exposing them
to billboards, the front pages of newspapers in newspaper boxes, and the behavior of others in
public spaces.
103 See ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY
1, 13 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990) ("The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in
which all good things coexist, seems to me to be not merely unattainable-that is a truism-
but conceptually incoherent; I do not know what is meant by a harmony of this kind. Some
among the Great Goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed to
choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss.").
104 See infra Part IV.A.
105 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 36, at 968-69.
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social interest in the education of children, and he suggests that this social interest
is best served by allowing children to grow up in dissenting traditions." As he writes,
"there are important societal reasons to allow [parents] a degree of control over what
their own children learn. The courts should not cooperate in efforts to make the family,
in effect, an extension of state policy .... ,,07 An alternative conclusion would have
"totalizing implications," for it would imply "that the state does after all have the power
to stifle the construction of centers of dissent from its preferred meanings, as long as
it gets to the potential dissenters while they are children."' ° As an illustration, Carter
offers a disturbing story from his childhood: "I remember my own experience in the
public schools of Washington, D.C., in the late 1960s, during which time I was taught
that the slaves were basically happy and only a few hotheads actually wanted to be
free; most of the slaves, we were taught, wanted kind masters.""0 Carter's parents
"did not want their children taught that only a few of the slaves wanted to be free
because it was not true."'' " Surely, not only the Carter family, but society at large
would have benefitted from wider diffusion of the truth about slavery.
We can, presumably, all agree that the schools should not have taught this doctrine.
It is, after all, false, and I presume that almost no one thinks that schools should teach
falsehoods. The question is, given that the schools did teach that slaves were happy,
what options should have been open to Carter's parents? Carter's own answer is that
"parents, as part of the exercise of their religious liberty, should have a broad freedom
to exclude their children from objectionable programs and teaching in the schools."" '
Carter thus avoids the monism that plagues Gilles's theory-he does not ignore the
social benefit in education or subsume it entirely to the benefits to the child and parents.
Rather, Carter argues that a focus on the social benefits of education leads one to appre-
ciate the virtue of dissent"2 and thus to support parentalism, which enables dissent.
" Carter, Parents, supra note 63, at 1209-10, 1224.
107 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 174 (1993) [hereinafter CARTER,
CULTURE].
108 Carter, Parents, supra note 63, at 1208.
109 Id. at 1223.
110 CARTER, CULTURE, supra note 107, at 181. The thesis that most slaves were basically
happy was propounded by, among others, Samuel Eliot Morison, one of the preeminent histo-
rians of his day and co-author of a widely read college textbook on American history. The thesis
was known to be false by the 1950s. See Kenneth M. Stampp, The Historian and Southern
Negro Slavery, 57 AM. HIST. REv. 613,616-18 (1952). Morison removed references to this
thesis from the 1962 edition of his textbook. See I.A. Newby, Historians and Negroes, 54
J. NEGRO HIST. 32, 41 (1969). However, it is not surprising that there would be some lag
between the removal of an incorrect thesis from college texts and the time it stopped being
taught at the primary and secondary level.
.. Carter, Religious, supra note 57, at 10-11; see also Carter, Parents, supra note 63, at
1207 (arguing that Mozert was wrongly decided).
..2 See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED (1998)
(advocating the social value of dissent).
20061
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
But the story of the young Stephen Carter might well suggest a different answer.
After all, Carter's parents did teach him that the happy slaves thesis was wrong, and
they did not have to pull him out of school to do so. As Carter writes, "[i]f one dis-
likes a teaching, one can argue against it, as my parents did when I was taught in
junior high school that slaves were essentially happy in the antebellum South."" 3
Indeed, in responding to critics who assert the need for civic virtues to be taught in
mandatory schools, Carter asks how they know "that values not taught in schools
will not be learned?"
'' 14
The same question may be turned on Carter: how can he assert that children will
not learn to dissent outside of school hours? In fact, the evidence suggests that they
do. After all, as Carter notes, surveys show that forty-four percent of American adults
claim to accept the Genesis account of creation and another thirty-eight percent believe
that God guided evolution." 5 It has been held unconstitutional for public schools to
teach either of those positions,' " 6 and over eighty-nine percent of American school
children are in public schools." 7 The conclusion is inevitable: a lot of school kids
are learning about creationism despite the fact that it was not taught to them in
school. In fact, since most public schools teach Darwinian evolution, one can go
further: a lot of school kids are learning to believe in creationism despite what they
are taught in public school.
Whether one sees this as worrisome or welcome, it is impossible to see it as
evidence that the public school curriculum stifles dissent. Children are surrounded
by sources of value: parents, churches, civic groups, popular culture, friends, school,
etc. School is undoubtedly a major influence, but it is not so pervasive as to prevent
dissent from arising. In this light, it is hard to see the necessity of Carter's opt-out
provision unless his position is that parents should be able to pass on their values
without having to worry about any conflicting sources of value. This is not only unre-
alistic,"l8 it also does not follow from Carter's argument about the social importance
of dissent.
Carter's position would, moreover, make it impossible for the state to present
children with a coherent message." 9 That is, it would make conscious social repro-
113 CARTER, CULTURE, supra note 107, at 181.
114 Carter, Parents, supra note 63, at 1209.
"' CARTER, CULTURE, supra note 107, at 159-60.
116 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a requirement that "creation
science" be given equal time with evolution in public schools); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968) (striking down a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools).
117 National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2004, at tbl.36
(2005), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/dtO4_O36.asp (noting that, in the
2001-2002 school year-the last year for which data are available-89.5% of children
aged five to seventeen attended public elementary and secondary schools).
11 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
"9 The importance of such a message will be defended at infra Part IV.
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duction harder, if not impossible. As we have seen, the presentation of a coherent
message by the state does not mean that children will not learn to dissent from it. The
state's inability to present a coherent message, however, may make it difficult to per-
petuate the values underlying democratic self-government. In the next Part, we will
examine the republican argument against Yoder, which focuses intently on attempts
at conscious social reproduction through education.
III. THE IMPOSITIONS OF REPUBLICANISM
Amy Gutmann has presented the strongest non-neutral argument against Yoder. 20
I shall term her argument "republican" because it advocates "that social and political
institutions be shaped and modified so as to encourage individuals to acquire the
civic virtue which will ensure that they conscientiously fulfil their duties of political
participation."12' For Gutmann, "[w]ere students ready for citizenship, compulsory
schooling-along with many other educational practices that deny students the same
rights as citizens-would be unjustifiable."' 2 2 The primary purpose of compulsory
education in a democratic society is thus clearly readying students for democratic
citizenship. Of what is this education to consist? Democratic education must inculcate
democratic virtue, which Gutmann understands to be "the ability to deliberate, and
hence to participate in conscious social reproduction."' 23 Because the society for which
the students are being educated is a democratic one (and because an authoritarian
method of setting educational policy would surely undermine the democratic virtues
that education seeks to inculcate), Gutmann argues that high-level educational policy
should be set democratically. 124
120 See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (rev. ed. 1999).
121 Alan Patten, The Republican Critique of Liberalism, 26 BRrr. J. POL. SCI. 25, 30
(1996); see also Suzanna Sherry, Republican Citizenship in a Democratic Society, 66 TEx.
L. REv. 1229, 1229 (1988) ("Amy Gutmann's Democratic Education might equally well be
entitled Republican Education ...."). Other thinkers, including William Galston and
Stephen Macedo, present a republican vision of education similar to Gutmann's (although
it should be noted that both Galston and Macedo call themselves liberals). See WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, LIBERALPURPOSES 241-56 (1991); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST
1-12 (2000); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Non-
profit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 417,417-18 (2000).
Although these theorists disagree as to what the content of a civic education should be, they
all agree that students should be educated to be liberal democratic citizens and that this edu-
cation requires constraints on democratic decision-making. As I show in this Part, that position
is fundamentally untenable. For ease of presentation, I focus here on the arguments as Gutmann
presents them.
122 GUTMANN, supra note 120, at 94.
123 Id. at 46.
124 She states:
Although a school board may establish the curriculum, it must not dictate
how teachers choose to teach the established curriculum, as long as they
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There are, however, two very important substantive restraints on majoritarian
decision-making: the principles of non-repression and non-discrimination. 25 The
"principle of nonrepression prevents the state, and any group within it, from using edu-
cation to restrict rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and
the good society."'' 26 Because the focus is on rational deliberation, non-repression
allows the inculcation of character traits, "such as honesty, religious toleration, and
mutual respect for persons, that serve as foundations for rational deliberation of dif-
fering ways of life.' ' 127 Because "[tihe effect of discrimination is often to repress, at
least temporarily, the capacity and even the desire of these groups to participate in the
processes that structure choice among good lives," non-discrimination is the second
constraint on majoritarianism.128 It must be emphasized that Gutmann does not con-
ceive of these principles as a restraint on the democratic nature of education; rather, she
sees them as putting democratic constraints on majority rule. 29 Indeed, for Gutmann,
it is precisely the democratic nature of these constraints that justifies them.
We may better understand these constraints by seeing how they function in
practice. An analysis of Gutmann's discussion of the teaching of creationism in schools
will prove instructive. Gutmann argues that creationism may not be taught in public
schools because it violates the principle of non-repression:
The distinctly democratic problem with teaching creationism stems
from the fact that it... is believable only on the basis of a sectarian
religious faith. Teaching creationism as science--even as one
do not discriminate against students or repress reasonable points of
view. Although a school board may control the textbooks teachers use,
it may not control how teachers use those textbooks (within the same
principled constraints). The rationale for so limiting democratic author-
ity is straightforward: if primary school teachers cannot exercise intel-
lectual independence in their classrooms, they cannot teach students to
be intellectually independent.
Id. at 82 (footnote omitted). It is unclear where the dividing line is between the curriculum and
the means by which that curriculum is taught. It is, moreover, unclear that Gutmann's "rationale"
holds up-is it not equally plausible that a teacher constrained to teach in ways known to foster
intellectual independence would have more success in fostering that independence than a
teacher whose own intellectual independence leads him to be an authoritarian in the classroom?
125 Id. at 44-45.
126 id. at 44.
127 Id. Because Gutmann does not claim to value neutrality for its own sake, see id. at 46, this
use of rationality is not as problematic as the use of the same concept by political liberals.
See supra Part I.
128 GUTMANN, supra note 120, at 45.
129 See id. at 95 ("The principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination limit democratic
authority in the name of democracy itself. A society is undemocratic-it cannot engage in
conscious social reproduction-if it restricts rational deliberation or excludes some educable
citizens from an adequate education.").
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among several reasonable scientific theories-violates the prin-
ciple of nonrepression in indirectly imposing a sectarian religious
view on all children in the guise of science. 3°
It seems safe to assume that Gutmann's objection is not predicated on the fact that
creationism cannot properly be called science (i.e., the evidence for creationism'
does not flow from the scientific method); if that were her only concern, then the
public schools could drop the name "science" and teach creationism in a class on
"explanations for the natural world." It seems unlikely that Gutmann would be sat-
isfied with this merely cosmetic change. Her objection seems to rest on her claim
that teaching creationism imposes a sectarian religious view on all of the children
rather than on her claim that it does so in the name of science. Indeed, Gutmann writes
that, "[i]f democratic majorities in a religiously diverse society refuse to differenti-
ate between a sectarian and a secular curriculum, they will unintentionally thwart
the development of shared intellectual standards among citizens, and discredit
public schools in the eyes of citizens whose religious beliefs are not reflected in the
established curriculum."'' 32
But this cannot be right. As we have already seen, a large majority of Americans
believe either in creationism or in "guided" evolution. 3 Surely, requiring schools
to tell the majority that it is wrong discredits public schools in the eyes of many mem-
bers of the majority. And surely the promotion of shared intellectual standards is ac-
complished at least as easily-if not more so-by teaching what most of them are
already inclined to believe, rather than by teaching the opposite. At bottom, Gutmann's
objection to teaching creationism seems to rest on her intuition that secular rea-
soning is non-sectarian and open to all, whereas religious reasoning is sectarian and
exclusive. But she does not explain how she has come to this conclusion. Each relies
on its own hermeneutic. " Each requires a bedrock faith in that hermeneutic. "' We
230 Id. at 103.
"' Contrary to the belief of some secularists, acceptance of creationism does rest on
evidence. The appeal to biblical text, for example, is an appeal to evidence, although the
secularist would presumably insist that it is not an appeal to good evidence. Part of the
dispute, then, is a dispute over hermeneutics. See CARTER, CULTURE, supra note 107, at 167.
To the secularist tempted to reply that only scientific evidence is extemally verifiable, one
must ask: verifiable by whom? Certainly, a person disinclined to trust his sensory perceptions
would fail to be persuaded by much scientific evidence.
132 GUTMANN, supra note 120, at 104.
133 See supra text accompanying note 115.
1 ' See supra note 131.
'31 See DAvID HUME, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in ENQUIRIES
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 1,
25-45 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1975) (arguing
that the principle of causal regularity-upon which all science is based-rests simply upon
a habit of human thought and cannot itself be justified).
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
can all think of cases of believers in the religious hermeneutic convincing believers
in the secular hermeneutic (we call this "conversion" or "finding salvation") and vice-
versa ("losing the faith"). How, then, can Gutmann claim that the secular is non-
sectarian and open, while the religious is sectarian and exclusive? Surely, the person
who believes that the creation account in Genesis is literally true would find nothing
inclusive about a rule forbidding the use of his hermeneutic and requiring the use
of a competing one. Gutmann has not shown that teaching creationism is any more
repressive than teaching evolution. It is unclear, then, how Gutmann can assert that
banning creationism from the classroom even if the democratic majority wants it to
be taught is consistent with a commitment to democracy.
I have discussed the evolution example at length because it illustrates what
many would no doubt suspect about a theory like Gutmann's: although she claims
that her limits on majoritarianism serve only as procedural mechanisms to promote
democracy, they in fact serve to privilege Gutmann's beliefs about what should be
taught, even in the face of contrary beliefs by the democratic majority. Indeed, the
problem is not unique to creationism. Whether the curricular topic under analysis
is sex education, critical reasoning, literature, civics, or character education, any curri-
cular choice will result in the privileging of one hermeneutic over others, with the
corresponding sense by those adhering to the disfavored hermeneutics that they are
being excluded or imposed upon. The principles of non-repression and non-dis-
crimination, if applied honestly, provide no guidance with respect to curricular choices.
Gutmann's democratic restraints on majoritarianism thus fade away, and the prin-
ciple we are left with is majority rule in matters of education. This conclusion is
unappealing to Gutmann,'36 but in the next Part we shall inquire whether it is really
so bad.
IV. THE DEMOCRATIC-COMMUNITARIAN ALTERNATIVE
In this Part, I shall offer an alternative analysis of the Yoder problem. I have
termed this approach democratic-communitarian because it incorporates elements
from communitarian political theory to advocate a democratic answer to the Yoder
problem. I shall argue that this approach can address many of the legitimate concerns
raised by the alternative theories discussed above.
A. The Communitarian Intuition
I begin with a principle to which I have made oblique reference several times
above:"'3 7 each of us is the product of multiple sources of value.' 38 These sources
136 See GUJTMANN, supra note 120, at 95-96.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 102--04, 113-18.
138 I understand this principle to be the central insight of communitarian political theory.
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sometimes work in concert, they sometimes work in tension, and they sometimes
work toward completely different ends. As Michael Sandel has put it,
Each of us moves in an indefinite number of communities, some
more inclusive than others, each making different claims on our
allegiance, and there is no saying in advance which is the society
or community whose purposes should govern the disposition of
any particular set of our attributes and endowments. 139
Indeed, we might well characterize the human subject as that being which exists at
the intersection of communal sources of value; to the extent that human subjectivity
is characterized by freedom, that freedom may be said to consist in manipulating the
various value sources into a coherent social identity. 40 To a large extent, of course,
human subjectivity is not characterized by freedonm--many of our values are not chosen
but rather are taken as given from one or more of our sources of value. Thus, many reli-
gious people would insist that they did not choose their religion-they were born
into it or called to it. Moreover, their religious identity is not something added on top
of their personhood; rather, it is an integral part of their subjectivity. Certain values
cannot be divorced from the subject without destroying that subject.' This is true not
only of religious believers-many secularists would insist that their attachment to their
family, for example, is both unchosen and constitutive of their very subjectivity.
Civil and political society are an essential part of this picture. Indeed, sources of
value come in all sizes, from the supra-national to the individual. In general, it is and
should be the case that lower-level sources of value are thicker than higher-level
sources. That is, those sources closer to the individual (family, church, local commu-
nity, etc.) present the individual with a more comprehensive set of values than those
further away (political party, state, nation, international community, etc.).
This understanding that human values have multiple sources which radiate outward
in concentric circles from the individual allows us to address Stephen Carter's concern
However, it should be noted that there is not widespread agreement-even among commu-
nitarian theorists themselves-as to what constitutes their common core. See STEPHEN
MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNrTARIANS, at xiv-xv (2d ed. 1996) (noting
the lack of consensus among communitarian theorists and their resulting reluctance to self-
identify as communitarians).
139 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LBERAIJSM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 146 (2d ed. 1998).
""' In this, I am indebted to Hannah Arendt's similar analysis of the present as the space
in which the individual exercises freedom by taking the given past and creating the heretofore
undetermined future. See HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 3-15 (1968).
141 That Rawls' s original position attempts to draw a sharp distinction between the self and
its ends, circumstances, and sources of value is one of the primary communitarian objections
to it. See SANDEL, supra note 139, at 15-65; see also MULHALL & SwIFt, supra note 138, at
50-59.
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about the totalizing implications of state educational requirements. 42 Hannah Arendt
famously analogized totalitarianism to "a band of iron which holds [its subjects] so
tightly together that it is as though their plurality had disappeared into One Man of
gigantic dimensions."' 4 3 We can understand this to mean that totalitarianism is what
happens when a high-level source of value gets too thick-its increasing thickness
pushes subjects together until their permissible value set is wholly determined by
this single value source." It viciously represses any and all competing value sources
and thereby seeks to destroy diversity. With only one source of value, there can be no
space in which to manipulate values, and any possibility for human freedom vanishes. '45
Because higher-level sources of value tend to have greater access to the instruments
of physical coercion, we more plausibly fear totalitarianism from them than from
lower-level value sources.
However, our fear of totalitarianism must not lead us to restrict the powers of
high-level value sources too tightly. For one thing, their greater coercive power can act
to prevent totalitarian behavior at lower levels as when the state takes a child away from
an abusive parent or when a coalition of states removes a totalitarian dictator from
power. For another thing, although danger results when high-level value sources are
too thick, it must be remembered that they are, nonetheless, sources of value. It cannot
be doubted that many Americans consider their Americanness to be central to their
identity and to contribute materially to their values and ideals. No doubt the same can
be said of citizens of other nations. No doubt the same can be said of many Americans'
state citizenship-plenty of Texans, Californians, and Vermonters would insist that
their state has a distinct ethos, which forms a part of its citizens' identities.
In order to maintain social order, the higher-level value sources must be given
lexical priority over the lower-level sources; in order to prevent totalitarianism, the
higher-level value sources must be kept thinner than the lower-level sources. In
other words, when dominant society-wide norms conflict with local norms, the
dominant social norms must prevail, but, as a society, we should be committed to
exercising our power to override local norms only when necessary. The obvious
142 See supra text accompanying note 108.
"41 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARLANISM 465-66 (1976).
144 Vdclav Havel has written perhaps the most haunting account of how totalitarian ideology
destroys competing value systems. See Vdclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless, in THE
POWER OF THE POWERLESS: CTIZENS AGAINST THE STATE IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE 23,
27-29 (John Keane ed., 1985).
141 See ARENDT, supra note 143, at 466 (noting that totalitarianism "destroys the one essen-
tial prerequisite of all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion, which cannot exist with-
out space"); see also Havel, supra note 144, at 79 (noting that the only possibility of freedom
for a subject living under totalitarianism lies in the creation of a "parallel polis," an "area where
a different life can be lived, a life that is in harmony with its own aims and which in turn struc-
tures itself in harmony with those aims"--that is, the only possibility for freedom lies in the
creation of open space).
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analogy is to federalism: federal law is supreme, 4 6 but federal lawmaking power
is constrained.'47
The question, then, is how we can best promote society-wide values without
unnecessary infringements on local values. The best answer is to attempt to match
institutions to the level of value they are best able to promote. This is, in essence, a
"separate spheres" approach-a recognition that different institutions will have
different social roles and will promote different values.'48 Families promote the
values important to the family; churches, synagogues, and mosques promote the
values important to their religions; the promotion of popular culture is left to the
market; and state institutions promote the values of society as a whole.
Seen in this light, schools are ideally suited for the inculcation of social values.
Schools are a place where children from very different sorts of families, religious
traditions, and ideological backgrounds are brought together and taught the same
subjects. There is no other social institution which brings together all future cit-
izens of the polity and has the capacity to teach them those traditions, values, mores,
and practices that are essential to their participation in and reproduction of their
culture. Education is thus that enterprise best suited to the inculcation of the values
of higher-level value sources. In Michael Walzer's words, "Education expresses what
is, perhaps, our deepest [social] wish: to continue, to go on, to persist in the face
of time. It is a program for social survival."' 49 No other institution could play this
role as well, for it is only in schooling that all young citizens are brought together
and taught about their common cultural heritage and ideals. In short, schools have
a comparative advantage in the inculcation of the values of society at large, just as
other social institutions have a comparative advantage in the inculcation of other
sources of value.s°
B. The Democratic Intuition
If schools are meant to inculcate large-scale social values, how are we to deter-
mine which values they should inculcate? In a democratic society, the only answer
'46 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
7 See id. amend. X.
148 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 6 (1983) ("[Tlhe principles ofjustice are
themselves pluralistic in form;... different social goods ought to be distributed for different
reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and . . . all these
differences derive from different understandings of the social goods themselves .....
149 Id. at 197.
150 See GUTMANN, supra note 120, at 69 ("[Wle need not claim that society has a greater
interest in the education of children than do parents. The point is rather that parents command
a domain other than schools in which they can-and should-seek to educate their children,
to develop their moral character and teach them religious or secular standards and skills that
they value.") This is true, of course, not only of parents, but of religious institutions, civic
groups, etc.
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that can be offered definitively is a procedural one: the values should be determined
democratically. Curricular choices should be made by the elected representatives
of the community or directly by the community itself. As we saw in our discussion
of the republican argument against Yoder, no substantive restraints on the demo-
cratically determined curriculum can be justified in the name of democracy-such
restraints are always an attempt to entrench the republican's own preferred curricu-
lum. " ' This is not to say that there can be no substantive constraints on the political
process itself---clearly, discriminatory voting rules or rules violating the free speech
rights of advocates of a particular educational philosophy would make the voting proce-
dures themselves illegitimate. However, once a vote (whether that vote is a referendum
on curricular specifics or, much more likely, an election for curriculum decision-makers)
has been fairly held, any attempt to limit the substantive curricular decisions would be
an undemocratic attempt to entrench contested values in the face of majority opposition.
The question naturally arises: which democratic decision-makers should deter-
mine school curricula? After all, in a federalist system, there are a number of possi-
bilities. The answer, again, must remain indefinite. Returning to our communitarian
reasoning, it is clear that each level of government should impose only those restric-
tions necessary to inculcate the values shared at that level. The higher the percentage
of the curriculum that is determined by higher levels of government, the more other
value sources are squeezed out by something that, at the extreme, begins to look like
Arendt's iron band. 52 We can thus imagine that the federal government might regulate
to promote values that are perceived to be integral to American citizenship-it might
insist on basic proficiency in the "three Rs" and some knowledge of American govern-
ment and history. State governments might insist on some state history, and they might
approve only certain textbooks for use throughout the state. Local school boards
may insist on education in cultures or languages especially prevalent in the area. They
may seek to teach traditional local customs, beliefs, or skills. They may place a
special emphasis on preparing their students for entry into local industries. The precise
division of power will remain a subject of political contention, for the relative impor-
tance of different value sources is inevitably contested. This should not worry us
unduly-the political safeguards of federalism will operate to protect lower-level
decision-makers from being overpowered by higher-level ones."' Indeed, recent
'1 See supra Part III.
152 See supra text accompanying note 143.
13 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961)
("Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand
ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposi-
tion towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will
infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the
other as the instrument of redress."). See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954) (arguing that the states as entities shape the federal system
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years have seen robust debates and compromises on the amount of power the federal
government should exercise in determining school curricula. 1
54
C. The Democratic-Communitarian Answer to the Yoder Problem
We are now in a position to articulate the democratic-communitarian position
on Yoder. This position holds that Yoder was wrongly decided because it took educa-
tional decision-making power away from the democratic people and gave it to individual
parents and to the courts, which were tasked with weighing the competing interests
of the parents and the state. In the democratic-communitarian paradigm, judicial inquiry
into educational policy should be limited to two questions: (1) was the policy-making
procedure fair and democratic?, and (2) was the policy impermissibly motivated by
animus toward a group or groups?'55 As long as question (1) is answered in the affir-
mative and question (2) is answered in the negative, the judiciary's role is over. As
we have seen, counter-majoritarian substantive curricular constraints cannot be demo-
cratically justified. '56
But what the courts should do is only half of the question. What advice does the
democratic-communitarian view have to offer the conscientious citizen or politician?'57
As we have seen, with a communitarian view of society comes a fear that too much
authority will be exercised by high-level sources of value. The conscientious citizen
is thus asked to make an honest judgment about how thick the communal norms are
at each level and how much those communal norms need to be inculcated through
schooling. The citizen is asked to keep in mind that the thickest sources of value will
and should be those at the lowest level. This means that the citizen will want to ponder
carefully which social values are important to reproduce nation-wide, state-wide, and
school district-wide. The citizen will also want to consider whether some topics should
not be addressed in schools or should be addressed but with parents having the option
to pull their children out of class while that topic is being addressed.
These decisions will entail ajudgment that certain topics are properly dealt with
by extracurricular value sources. The fact that Yoder' s judicially created exemption
and the national legislative process).
"' Compare Gina Austin, Note, Leaving Federalism Behind: How the No Child Left
BehindAct Usurps States' Rights, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 337 (2005) (asserting that recently
imposed federal curricular requirements usurp states' rights), with James E. Ryan, The
Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 932, 987-88 (2004)
(arguing that the federal government should enforce curricular standards on schools if the
schools are unable to meet a high level of achievement on their own).
"' This is the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye standard discussed supra Part II.A.
156 See supra Part Ill.
117 See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 STAN. L. REv. 585, 586 (1975) (noting that courts and legislatures may apply different
standards-and therefore, come to different conclusions-when considering the constitu-
tionality of the same law).
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from generally applicable education laws was illegitimate does not mean that a similar
exemption could not have been granted democratically. What was objectionable in
Yoder was not the decision that some students need not be educated past eighth grade-
the proper amount of schooling is a contestable and contested question, and eighth
grade is no more arbitrary a line than any other. What was objectionable in Yoder
was the fact that this contested question was taken out of the hands of the democratic
people and given to individual parents and the courts. A democratic majority may
decide not to require education past eighth grade,just as it may decide not to require
sex education or to allow parents to remove their children from the sex education
class. For that matter, a democratic majority may decide not to require any school
at all. We may think that some of these decisions are profoundly unwise, but there
is no democratic principle which allows us to enshrine our conception of wisdom
in the face of a contrary majority.158
Likewise, a majority may decide whether or not to allow private schools or home
schools to exist. The outcome in Pierce may have been justified by the Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye standard,159 but this does not mean that a law requiring all children
to be educated in public schools that was passed, not out of animus toward a group or
groups, but rather because of a democratic judgment that all children should be educated
together, should be struck down."6 Of course, the democratic-communitarian stan-
dard would counsel a citizen or legislator to ponder long and hard before passing a law
prohibiting private schooling. In order to support such a law, the citizen would have
to satisfy herself that necessary social values could not be effectively inculcated through
regulated private schools. If they could be, then the communitarian principle of
keeping high-level value sources as thin as possible will require her to vote against
158 This is not to say that democracy never involves restraints on majoritarian decisions. I am,
instead, making the more modest point that, in a democracy, a restraint on majoritarian decision-
making must be justified by some principle other than the minority's belief that it is wiser than
the majority. After all, the majority presumably thinks that it has wisdom on its side, as well.
19 See supra Part II.A.
"r The Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), suggests that
it remains convinced by the substantive due process reasoning of Pierce. An analysis of the
doctrine of substantive due process is well beyond the bounds of this Article. Suffice it to say
that Justice Scalia' s dissent seems far more in keeping with a commitment to democracy than
does the plurality opinion or the concurrences:
[W]hile I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to
representative democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue,
in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the State has no
power to interfere with parents' authority over the rearing of their
children, I do not believe that the power which the Constitution confers
upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my
view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.
Id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the law. Assuming the people do vote to allow private schooling, the question of
how tightly to regulate private schools will also be up for democratic resolution.
In short, the democratic-communitarian answer to the Yoder problem is to suggest
that the problem with Yoder was the identity of the decision-maker. The people may
democratically choose to allow the Old Order Amish to remove their children from
school after eighth grade, or they may choose to require them to satisfy the same educa-
tional requirements as all other students. But there is no constitutional principle that
allows a court to remove this question from the democratic arena. The democratic-com-
munitarian analysis does, however, suggest that conscientious citizens and legislators
should take seriously a request to be exempt from generally applicable education laws
and should grant that request unless it would prevent the transmission of what they
consider to be important social values.
D. Objections and Responses
There are three likely objections to the democratic-communitarian analysis
presented above. I shall describe and attempt to respond to each.
Objection 1. Under this proposal, most school districts in the country will throw
out their biology textbooks and teach creationism.
This objection seems to rest upon the large number of Americans who say they
believe in creationism or "guided" evolution.' 6 ' There are two responses to this objec-
tion. The first is empirical: it is not at all clear that the democratic people want crea-
tionism to be taught instead of evolution. It is a perfectly intelligible position to believe
in creationism or guided evolution and yet think that it should not be taught in schools.
Indeed, consider the recent controversy over the attempt to introduce a brief statement
about intelligent design into the biology curriculum in Dover, Pennsylvania. 6 2 It
should be noted, first, that this statement was in addition to the teaching of evolution,
not instead of it (the same was true of Kansas's decision "to include challenges to
Darwinian theory in the state [educational] standards" 63). That is, a divided school
board opted for a compromise on a contentious issue. This compromise, however,
proved unacceptable to the voters. In school board elections held four days after the
end of the trial in a suit contesting the legality of the intelligent design statement,164
eight candidates who ran on a slate opposing adding intelligent design to the curric-
ulum were elected.165 Not a single candidate who supported intelligent design in the
161 See supra text accompanying note 115.
162 See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707,708-09 (M.D.Pa. 2005).
163 Margaret Talbot, Darwin in the Dock, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66, 66.
'64 After the school board elections, the court ruled that the intelligent design statement
violated the First Amendment. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
165 Talbot, supra note 163, at 77.
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classroom won. 1" In other words, it is not at all clear that voters would choose to elimi-
nate evolution from the classroom and replace it with creationism. 67
But the second response must be: so what if they did throw out evolution and teach
creationism? I believe that any school board that made this decision would be making
a horrible mistake, and I would protest against this mistake with every democratic
means at my disposal. But why should my objection be privileged over the equally
strong sentiments of the majority of my fellow citizens? We have discovered no prin-
ciple that allows the entrenching of my minority point of view over that of the majority
-appeals to neutrality fail, 168 as do appeals to non-repression and non-discrimination. 69
This is not a question of relativism--I still believe that my objections to teaching crea-
tionism are right-it is simply a matter of democratic humility. It is easy to be a demo-
crat when the rest of the demos agrees with one's policy choices, but what allows
democracy to function is that citizens commit in advance to recognizing the legiti-
macy of democratic decisions with which they disagree. My objections to teaching
creationism or intelligent design, like my fellow citizens' objections to teaching evolu-
tion, belong in the public arena. If a fair democratic decision goes against me, then I
will have to teach my children about evolution outside of school.
Objection 2. The democratic-communitarian analysis allows for the totalitarian
suppression of dissent.
It is the simple fact that I can teach my children about evolution-or creationism,
or sex, or the novels of Faulkner--outside of school that prevents democratically
controlled education from becoming democratic totalitarianism. We have seen Stephen
Carter's fear that a democratically determined curriculum with no opt-out provision
for disgruntled parents could become "totalizing" and suppress dissent.' 70 But we have
166 Id.
167 See Neela Banerjee & Anne Berryman, At Churches Nationwide, Good Words for
Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,2006, at A16 (noting a growing movement among churches
to preach in favor of evolution); Monica Davey & Ralph Blumenthal, Fight Over Evolution
Shifts in Kansas School Board Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at A15 (noting the electoral
ouster of Kansas Board of Education members who had voted to adopt "science standards that
were the most wide-reaching in the nation in challenging Darwin's theory of evolution"); Laurie
Goodstein, Intelligent Design Might Be Meeting Its Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, § 4, at
1 (noting that intelligent design is losing credibility, even among those thought to be "natural
allies"); Rudoren, supra note 8 (noting the final eleven-to-four vote in favor of scrapping chal-
lenges to evolution in Ohio's tenth grade biology curriculum); Jodi Rudoren, Ohio Expected
to Rein in Class Linked to Intelligent Design, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, at A12 (noting
Ohio's move away from a curriculum critical of evolution that was adopted four years ago and
seeing this move as part of "a sea change across the country against intelligent design").
161 See supra Part I.A.
169 See supra Part III.
"o See supra Part II.C.
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also seen that children do still learn things that are not taught in school (indeed, they still
learn things that are directly opposed to what they are taught in school, as when the
young Stephen Carter learned that slaves were not content in the antebellum South).
Value sources are myriad, and values not learned from one may well be learned from
another. Complete democratic control over one value source (the schools) is not totali-
tarian; complete control of one value source over all others (Arendt's iron band) 7 1
is. Moreover, democratic control of education will likely leave significant power
in the hands of parents. If Pierce were overruled tomorrow, is it plausible that states
would rush to outlaw private schools? Indeed, under the Pierce regime,
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reason-
ably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine
them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper
age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral char-
acter and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential
to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught
which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare. 72
Yet most states have very few regulations on private schools.' The democratic
impulse is not a totalitarian impulse; decisions that can be left to lower-level decision-
makers while still allowing the values of society at large to be inculcated generally
are left to the lower-level decision-makers; and dissent continues to flourish.
171 See supra text accompanying note 143.
172 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
173 To take one example, in 2000, the Federal Department of Education reported that
Texas had the following curricular requirements for private schools:
Students attending a private or parochial school are exempt from
compulsory attendance at a public school if the school includes in its
course a study of good citizenship.
A school district must ensure that records or transcripts of a transfer
student from a Texas nonpublic school are evaluated and that the student
is placed in appropriate classes promptly. A transfer student from a Texas
nonpublic school must complete all state requirements for graduation.
Student credits earned in non-public schools accredited by
members of [the Texas Private School Accreditation Commission] are
transferable to Texas public schools.
A driver's education school shall receive approval from the Texas
Education Agency prior to conducting a course at a private school.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS
-TEXAS (2000), http://www.ed.gov/pubs/RegPrivSchl/texas.html (citations omitted). This
author can attest from personal experience that the "study of good citizenship" requirement
was not rigorously enforced.
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Objection 3. Under the democratic-communitarian approach, nothing remains of
religious freedom.
On the contrary, I would assert that we have seen at least three important elements
which form the core of democratic-communitarian religious freedom. First, we have the
judicial component. As we saw, Church ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye stands for the propo-
sition that the state may not target a religious group or groups for disfavored treat-
ment. '74 The Court's blessing of inquiries that go behind the text of the law to find
animus in its intent gives this principle real teeth. 17 This is a weighty principle-
surely, it is at the very core of what we mean when we speak of religious freedom that
the state may not punish me because I am Jewish or Muslim or Catholic.
The remaining two elements of democratic-communitarian religious freedom
may not be judicially enforceable, but that does not make them any less potent. The
second is the fact that, in line with the communitarian intuition discussed above, we
do tend to exempt religious groups from generally applicable laws when we think that
doing so will not be inimical to our attempt to inculcate social values. This takes many
forms, ranging from allowing private education and home schooling to exempting
wine used for religious purposes from the National Prohibition Act.'76 These exemp-
tions indicate a democratic determination that religious belief as a source of value is
important enough to overcome the goal of the otherwise applicable law. A society's
willingness seriously to consider claims for such exemptions is an important element of
religious freedom.
Finally, religious freedom is protected by our tradition of dissent, discussed above.
The dernocratic-communitarian theory suggests that school curricular decisions should
be made democratically, but it equally suggests that family decisions should be made
by the family, church decisions by the church, etc. These institutions can pass on reli-
gious values, and they can serve as focal points for political activism in pursuit of
democratically granted exemptions from laws which the religious group finds uncon-
genial. Taken together, these elements form a robust conception of religious freedom.
CONCLUSION
As continuing debates over religion and school curricula demonstrate, the Yoder
problem is still very much with us. This should not be surprising-it is a difficult
problem, necessitating an examination of some of the deepest principles underpin-
ning our collective life. Thoughtful scholars have heretofore put forward four broad
categories of arguments about the Yoder problem. There have been arguments both
for and against Yoder sounding in liberal neutrality; there have been parentalist
"4 See supra Part I1.A.
'7 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
176 Pub. L. No. 66, tit. II, § 6, 41 Stat. 305, 311 (1919).
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arguments for Yoder; and there have been republican arguments against Yoder. In
this Article, I have tried to show that, while each of these arguments raises important
questions and concerns, each of them is also deeply flawed. As an alternative, I
have put forward a democratic-communitarian answer to the Yoder problem. I have
attempted to show both that this answer corresponds to our communitarian and
democratic intuitions, and also that it is able to address the important concerns
raised by the other theories. It is my contention that the democratic-communitarian
theory provides the best model for how a pluralist democracy can address the
intersection of education and religious belief.
